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THE ISOLATION PARADOX AND THE DISCOUNT RATE 
FOR BENEFIT-COST ANALYSIS 
Peter G. Warr and Brian D. Wright 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A dominant issue in the literature on benefit-cost analysis has 
been the appropriateness or otherwise of using market rates of discount 
for the intertemporal aggregation of benefits and costs. One important 
argument for using a non-market rate of discount is based on the insight 
that under certain assumptions individuals would voluntarily enter into 
a social contract committing them to increase their total savings, for 
the benefit of future generations, above the level they chose privately. 
This divergence of collective and individual behavior, which is a mani­
festation of the famous "prisoner's dilemma"_ problem of game theory, was 
postulated by Baumol [1952] and Eckstein [1958] an~ was called the "isola­
tion paradox" by Sen [1961] in a study of optimal saving. 
In two celebrated papers Marglin [1963a, 1963b] argued that in 
an economy containing both private saving for benevolent purposes and 
public investment the existence of an isolation paradox can justify the 
use of a discount rate for benefit-cost analysis which is below the private 
rate of return on savings. This argument is now widely recognized in 
1.the literature on benefit-cost methodology , with major criticisms con-
centrating on the empirical validity of the assumptions about individual 
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preferences postulated in the formal development of the model in Sen [1967). 2 
Since the parameters concerned are difficult to measure, the likelihood 
that the isolation paradox will indeed exist has become largely a matter 
of individual judgement. On the other hand, there has been essentially 
no challenge to the conclusion that if an isolation paradox of the Narglin­
Sen type does exist the appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit­
cost analysis lies below the market rate of discount. 
The present paper takes issue with this conclusion. Taking the 
isolation paradox argument on its own terms, it aims to show that the 
appropriate rate of discount for use in benefit-cost analysis is the 
market rate of discount, whether the isolation paradox actually holds or 
not. This is done by constructing a simple general equilibrium model re­
flecting the inter-generational benevolence lying at the heart of the 
isolation paradox analysis. Like Marglin and Sen, we ignore other capital 
market distortions. This model is presented in Section II. In Section 
III it is then shown that the appropriate rate of discount for use in 
benefit-cost analysis in this model is the market rate of discount, re-
·gardless of whether the Marglin-Sen assumptions on individual preferences 
and distributional mechanisms, implying the existence of an isolation 
paradox, are imposed on the model. The alternative approach advocated 
hy ~arglin [1936h] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] imposes far more 
formidable data requirements and c,.mld at best produce results which are 
equivalent to the calculation of net present value using the market rate 
of discount: but in Section IV we argue that in general no such equivalence 
is possible. 
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II. PRIVATE SAVINGS AND THE ISOLATION PARADOX 
Structure of the Model 
We begin with a simple general equilibrium model which captures 
the essence of the problem. The well known problems of generalizing 
3from two period savings models require us to begin with three periods 
(generations), denoted 0, 1 and 2. Since the focus of the paper is on 
inter-generational rather than intragenerational savinr,s, we imagine the 
life of each generation to be focused on a single discrete point in time 
and, for simplicity, the interval between generations will correspond to 
. a fixed period of time. In;ra-generational savings are thereby ignored, 
The existence of an isolation paradox in any generation requires that 
that generation contain a minimum of two individuals. So the first two 
generations, 0 and 1, each contain two individuals, denoted 1 and 2 and 
3 and 4, respectively. But since the isolation paradox cannot arise for 
the final generation (there is no subsequent generation for whom to save), 
it will contain only one individual, denoted 5. 
Each individual receives an income in lump sum form. He can then 
in principle make donations of two types: (i) to his contemporary, or 
(ii) to members of the next generation. The individual in the final 
period is an exception since, for vim, donations of hoth types are infeasible. 
Type (ii) donations earn a rate of return o and the proceeds are divided 
among the members of the succeeding generation. We assume that this rate of retur 
Pis unaffected by any of the marginal savings decisions or public invest-
ment projects occurring within the model and for simplicity we will suppose 
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it to be constant over time. It is convenient to think of p of as the 
rate of return available on an external capital market. The way type (ii) 
donations are divided among members of the next generation is, for now, 
left open. It may be determined by the donor himself (say, through a will), 
by some other, more rigid rule of distribution beyond his control, or by 
some combination of the two, but the donor is nevertheless aware of the 
way his donations are to be distributed. In keeping with the Marglin-Sen 
assumptions, it will presently be assumed that individual preferences are 
such that type (i) donations never occur while (except for period 2) all 
individuals make positive type (ii) donations. 
The utility of each individual depends on his own consumption, that 
of his contemporary and that of the members of the succeeding generation. 
The individual in the final generation is again the obvious exception. 
1 1 1 2 3 4 i 
So for individual 1, for example, U = U (c, c, c , c ), where c denotes 
the consumption of individual i. The utility of the individual in period 2 
depends simply on his own consumption. The utility function of each in­
dividual is strictly concave, twice differentiable and strictly increasing 
in all arguments with the possible exception of the consumption of his 
contemporary, in which it is non-decreasing. Hence, there is no malevolence. 
1 1 2 1 
The consumption of individual 1 is given hy c = Y - hl + h - s , 
1 1
where Y is his lump sum incom~h is his voluntary donation to his con-
temporary, individual 2, h 
2 
is his contemporary's donation to him, and 
1 13 + s 14 s = s is his total voluntary saving for the benefit of the next 
13 14 b i· s and e ng t hose port i ons of i t earmar or n 1v1 ua s 
3 3 3 
generation, s ked f i d. . d 1 
3 and 4, respectively. The consumption of individual 3 is c = Y - h 
+ h 4 - s 3 + (1 + p ) (s 13 + s 23) , where al1 terms are de f ined ana1ogous1y 
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as above. The final term indicates the savings contributions of individuals 
13 231 and 2 to individual 3 (s and s , respectively) which then earn the 
5 5 3 4rate of return p. For individual 5, c = Y + (1 + p) (s + s ). The 
expressions for the consumption of individuals 2 and 4 are directly anal­
ogous with those above for 1 and 3, respectively. 
Private Savings 
Consider now the private utility maximization problem of individual 
1, taking the behavio~ of all others individuals (in particular, his con­
temporary) as given. The Kuhn-Tucker conditions are 
hl (Ul Ul) Ul ul > (1)= O; 0
1 2 1 2 = 
and 
s 
1 (Ul - (1 + P) Ul) = O; Ul - (1 + P) Ul > (), (2)1 s 1 s = 
1 13
where U~ - au /acj and u; is a shorthand notation for (A 13u; + (1 - A ) U~). 
13 . 
Obviously, A denotes the marginal proportion of individual l's savings 
earmarked for individual 3, which may he either a choice variable or a 
parameter for individual 1. 
In parallel with the Marglin-Sen assumptions, we assume that individual 
1preferences are such that these conditions are satisfied by h = 0 and 




The story for individuals 2, 3 and 4 is identical. No one contributes 
voluntarily to his contemporary, but each saves voluntarily for the benefit 
of his successors. These future benefits are discounted by each individual 
-f,-
at the rate p, which is called alternatively the private rate of discount 
(return) or market rate of discount (return). 
The Isolation Paradox 
Imagine individuals 1 and 2 to have separately chosen their optimal 
levels of savings, behaving atomistically as above. We now consider a 
contract between them which collllllits each to raise his total level of 
savings by one unit. These additional savings earn the rate of return p 
as before and the proceeds are distributed to individuals 3 and 4 in the 
· 3 3proportions y and 1 - y , respectively. The effect on individual l's 




The debate in the literature has centered on whether or not it is 
reasonable to expect both the private optimal savings conditions derived 
du1 2above and > 0 and dU > O in (4) and (5) to hold. If they do, the 
isolation paradox hold?• meaning that the initial equilibrium under private 
savings was not Pareto optimal in what Marglin calls the "bourgeois democratic" 
sense namely that the welfare of only the current generation (generation 
4O) is considered. Since strategic behavior is ruled out, adoption of the 
above contract would be supported by a consensus of generation O. 
In a masterly paper, Sen (1967) sets out several sets of sufficient 
but not necessary conditions for this to be so. By substituting the 
1
optimal private savings condition (3) into (4), we see that au > 0 is 
equivalent to 
1 1u - u > 2(1 + p) (6)1 2 
-7-
. 13 3
Among Sen's sufficient conditions are the obvious ones of A = y 
5u!, either of which guarantees (6) since, also by assumption, 
2(Analogous conditions ensure that dU > O.) Neither of 
these special cases is as far-fetched, as it first 
13 appears. This is best seen by reconsidering the meaning of A • If 
13 13
A is a choice variable for individual 1, then provided both s and 
14 13 1 1 3 
s > O, he chooses A such that u = u • So the magnitude of y makes no
3 4 
difference to him for marginal collective decisions and~) holds imrnedi-
13ately. On the other hand, if A is a rigidly specified rule of distri-
bution, outside the control of individual 1, it is possible that u; f uz. 
But if the same rigid rule applies t.o the distribution of collective 
13 3savings as to private savings, as seems possible at least, A = y 
and again (6) follows. 
As several subsequent authors have pointed out, relation (6), knd 
the corresponding relations for individuals 2, 3 and 4, may or may not 
in fact hold, and this matter is not easily resolved em-
pirically. We do not propose to join the debate on this issue since it 
is our aim in the next section to ·show that whether these inequalities 
(or the opposite ones) hold or not makes no difference for the choice of 
the appropriate rate of discount for benefit-cost analysis. But for the 
moment, suppose that these inequalities do hold, as in (6;. Consider a 
. f . 1collective contract o f the above type earning a rate o return r , rather 
1
than p, such that dUl = 0. Solving for r we obtain 
(7) 
3 13 1 1
which, with either y = A or u = u4 becomes, utilizing (3),3 
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This is what Marglin and Seri each call the "social" rate of discount. 
This discount rate is not reflected in individual market behavior, as 
distinct from P, which is called the "private" rate of discount. Given 
1 1 1
the Marglin-Sen assumption that u > u , from (6) and (8) we have r < p
1 2 
and likewise, performing this exercize for individuals 2, 3 and 4, we 
have ri < p, i = 1, ... , 4; but there is nothing to ensure ri = rj, i / j. 
There is a value of r 
i 
for each individual in each generation and strong 
additional assumptions are needed to guarantee that they are the same. 
It seems somewhat odd to call such an individual discount rate the "social" 
rate when it is, in a very real sense, more "private" than p, the market 
rate. Nevertheless, r 
i 
applies to collective savings d_ecisions, while 
P applies to individual ones. Furthermore, however the aggregation prob-
lem of moving from the set ~ ri 'to "the;' social rate of discount, r, 
. i 
is resolved, it seems clear that since ri < p for all i, r < .P as well. 
Acting collectively, it seems, the members of society are prepared to 
undertake investments that, acting individually, they are not. 6 
To see the significance of ri~ imagine the introduction of a small 
public project which, to keep the example simple, affects the eon-
1
sumption of the two individuals in each generation equally. So de = 
2 3 4 5de = dC /2, de = de = dC /2, and de = dc2, where dCt denotes 0 1 
the cha~ge in total consumption in generation t. Consider its effects 
on the utility of individual 1. 
4




(1 + rl) 1 = 
(1 + p) dC
 + p) dC1 • 
(10)
·l 0 (1 + 
Ul 
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Suppose we have somehow determined the changes in final consumption in 
each period induced hy the project. To determine whether indivjdual lhas 
been made better off or worse off, it seems from (10) that the weight 
to be applied to the change in consumption in period 1 relative to that 
:i.n 
1
period O is 1/(1 + r ). The appropriate rate of discount, from in-
dividual l's point of view, is 1 r. 7Suppose, following Dasgupta, Marglin 




r = r. Then it seems that if we grant the exis-
tence of the isolation paradox, implying r < p, there is good reason for 
thinking that the appropriate discount rate for benefit-cost analysis 
is the "soc,ial'' rate of discount, r, a conclusion that has been widely 
accepted in the literature. But we shall now sr·ow that this argument 
is erroneous. 
-10-
III. GENERAL EQUILIBRIUM EFFECTS OF A PROJECT 
Suppose now that a "small" public (or private) investment project is 
adopted and can be described by a vector of net returns to the five indi-
viduals, spread out over the three periods. 
8 If all these net returns 
were positive (negative) the project would be unambiguously desirable 
(undersirable) and benefit-cost analysis would be unnecessary. To keep 
the problem non-trivial we suppose that at least one of these net returns 
is negative and at least one is positive. Let the net returns in period 0 
Xfrom project x sum to B0 , divided among individuals 1 and 2 in the pro-
portions a 0
x and 1 - a0 
X , respectively. Similarly, in period 1 these net 
returns sum to B1 
X , divided between individuals 3 and 4 in the proportions
X X · Xa
1 
and 1 - a
1 and in period 2 the net return is B2 , There are no sign 
restrictions on the total returns to any one generation or on the propor-
tions in which they are divided. For example, Bx
0 
may be negative (probably 
the typical case) but a: also negative, so that individual l's net return 
is positive while individual 2's is negative. We now wish to consider the 
adjustments that follow this. 
We wish to derive the change in the final consumption of each indi-
vidual resulting from the adoption of the project. For the five individuals 
this gives: 
dc1 = - ds1 + a~ B~, 
(ll) 
2 2 X Xde = - ds + (1 - a 0) B0 , (12) 
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and 
5 3 4 X (15)de c (1 + p)(ds + ds) + B2 
2
Now divide (13) and (14) by (1 + p) and divide (15) by (1 + p) and sum the 
six equations. This gives 
(16) 
Thus one constraint that the adjustment of consumption levels must 
satisfy is that the net present value of the stream of consumption changes, 
discounted at the rate P, must he equal to the net present value of the returns 
of the project, ,also discounted at the rate p. We shall refer to the latter, 
the right hand side of (16), as Nx. Next, there are four equilibrium conditions 
p 
relating to the voluntary donations of individuals 1 throught 4, described 
for individual 1 by (3), which must also be satisfied if these individuals 
are to have positive savings before and after the project is adopted. Dif­








1/(1 + p) 
Jl 
3 























0 dc 3 = 0 (17) 
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and for i • 3, 4, Ji -
i - (1 + p) UiS' k C: ), 4, 5.Uikk 
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The solutions to this system are given by 
dci • N; Ri, i = 1, •.• , 5. (18) 
i 11 IiWriting J for the square matrix in ( 17), R = J / IJI , where J is the 
cofactor of the element in the first row and ith column of J and !JI is 
the determinant of J. The general equilibrium change in the consumption 
of individual i due to the project is a constant, R,i multiplied by the net 
present value of the project discounted at the rate P, . N.
X 
p Note in particular 
that the Ri terms contain,!!£_ project-specific data. The characteristics of 
i, Xthe project enter the determination of the de sonly via the NP terms. With some 
relatively weak restrictions on individual utility functions it is possible 
to ensure that each of the R
i 
terms is strictly positive. It must be 
stressed that these restrictions are sufficient but not necessary for the 
strict positivity of the Ri terms and that none is in any way inconsistent 
with the existence of an isolation parar.ox. 
First, suppose the utility functions are additively separable. This 
itogether with our assumption of strict concavity, implies Ujk = 0, j r/: k 
i k iand Ukk < 0 (assuming c is an argumen·t of u , of course). We then have 
J.i 
1 
< 0 and 0 except that Jki = 0 when i and k are contempararies. This 
guiuantees 0 for all i, and is perfectly consistent with the existence 
(or non-existence) of the isolation paradox, but it is considerably stronger 
than we require. Next, suppose (i) that utility functions are additivelv 
separable between the consumption of that individual's contemporary and 
the other arguments of the function and (ii) that for i = 1, 2 
(AiJ u;K + (1 - AiJ) ui K) ~ O, k • 3, 4. Assumption (i) means that the utility4 
1 1 2 3 4function of individual 1, for example, can be written U (c, c , c , c) 
1 1 3 4 1 2 = f (c , c , c) + g (c ). This is of course, consistent with the isolation 
1 2 2paradox (imagine the extreme case where dg (c )/de a 0, representing 
indifference towards one's contemporary) and ensures again that Jk
i 
c 0, 
where i and k are contemporaries. Assumption (ii) is again consistent 
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with the isolation paradox and with our concavity assumptions and implies 
that Jk
i 
> 0, where k belongs to the generation following i. Together, 
these assumptions imply R
i > 0 for all i. 
Any set of assumptions implying J~ < 0, J! ~ 0, and IJ!I > IJ!I 
where i and k are contemporaries and J! > O, where k belongs to the genera­
tion following i, is sufficient to ensure the positivity of the Ri terms. 
These assumptions seem "reasonable", and there is no inconsistency between 
them and our concavity assumptions or with the isolation paradox. So 
grant for the moment that each of the R
i terms if positive. This means 
that, from (1~, the sign of the change in the consumption of each indiv-
9
idual is the same as the sign of Nx. p Furthermore, the sign o
f the change 
in the utility of each individual is the same as Nx. For individual 1, p 
for example, 
4 41
dU = I: I: 
(19)
k-= 1 k = 1 
1
Since u! ~ 0 for all k (no malevolence), M > 0 and individual 1 benefits or 
loses from the project as N~ is positive or negative. 'fhe same applies to the 
other four individuals, 
i=l, ... ,5 (20) 
where Mi> 0 and, as with Ri, Mi contains no project-specific data. 
Now consider what is changed if the assumptions required in (6) for the 
existence of the isolation paradox are granted. Suppose the isolation 
paradox holds for all individuals in the first two generations. Still, 
the sign of the change in utility of each person due to a project is the 
same as that of every other, namely the sign of Nx. Whether the isolation p 
paradox holds or not, discounting the aggregate returns from the project 
in each year at the market rate of discount prov~des an adequate indication 
10 
of the welfare effects of the project. Clearly, if we have several 
i X 
mutua1ly exc1usive projects, provided R > 0 larger values of N p imply 
i i
larger values of de and dU; the projects can be ranked according to 
Nx. Furthermore, incorporation of income distributional considerations p 
-14-
into the choice of projects, to the extent that it leads to the ~election 
of projects with lower values of Nx, is clearly undesirable from the pointp 
of view of each individual, regardless of his initial lump-sum income. 
Now return to the issue of the signs of the Ri terms. Restrictions on 
individual preferences which,. in our view, are "weak", guarantee Ri > O, but 
examples not satisfying them and implying the negativity of one or more of 
the R
i 
terms could presumably be constructed. What would this mean? Consider 
the change in utility of individual 1 resulting from a project, as given 
by (19). iThe negativity of one or more of the R terms does not necessarily 
1 2imply the negativity of M, or similarly of M. It is easilv shown that 
Mi< 0 implies that individual i is made worse off by, for example, 
an increase in the lump sum income of each individual (Yk, where k = 1, . 
..• , 5), including himself. He is similarly harmed by an increase in 
his own income alone. This possibility seems sufficiently pathological 
to be disregarded, but it is clearly impossible for all the Mi terms to 
be negative. This would be inconsistent with the absence of malevolence 
in individual utility functions. 
It should be clear that the possibility that a project with 
Nx > 0 could gerierate dUi < 0 for some i rests on the nature of in­P 
dividual preferences and not on the distributional impact of the project. 
1 2Suppos~ though, that M and M hnve opposite signs and that projects are 
to be evaluated from the point of view of the present (initial) generation. 





> 0. Then 
2 i 2
dW = I W dU = Nx I W_Hi _
i=l i Pi=l 1 
Provided V > O, projects can be ranked simply by examing Nx. Knowledgep 
of the precise form of Wis not required. In the bizarre case V < 0 
this would still be true, except that the rankings would be inverted, a 
possibility that hardly seems interestingJ1 we conclude that when there 
-15-
is inter-generational benevolence projects can be ran
ked according to 
their net present value at the market rate of disco
unt, whether the 
isolation paradox holds or not. 




have the same sign do not imply that r
1 = r 2• If we assume 
13 23 3 13 23 are control variableseither that A = A = y , or that A and A 
for individuals 1 and 2, either of which implies the
 existence of an 
1 . . h
isolation paradox for both individuals 1 and 2, r = r 
2 requires tat 
u;tu~ = Ui/u;. This is not implied by, in fact has very little to do 
with, the weak requirements for M
1 and M
2 to have the same sign. Even 
·
1 2 1 and r 
2 
will still typicallythough M and M have the same sign, r 
But if sign (M
1 
) = sign (M
2) any project that benefits in­differ. 
dividual 1 also benefits individual 2, and vice vers
a. Despite the fact 
that r 
1 # r 
2 
it is not possible to construct a project that harms
 one 
and benefits the other, the implications of the isol
ation paradox argument 
notwithstanding. 
What underlies these results is a "smoothing" of the
 impact of 
public projects both within and hetween generations 
via the private 
donations of individuals. If one generation or indi
vidual is initially 
O, this is compensatedaffected adversely by a project, even though Nxp >
 
for by a contraction in the voluntary donations of t
hose individuals to 
the next generation, so as to restore the donor's pr
ivate savings equi-
librium (given, for individual 1, by (3)). Individu
als affected dis­
proportionately favorably respond by increasing thei
r voluntary donations 
until their private savings equilibrium is restored.
 The first constraint 
on these adjustments is given by (16); the net prese
nt value of the 
-16-
stream of changes in consumption must sum to the net present value of 
12 
the project, both discounted at the market rate of discount. These two 
aspects of the problem, the "smoothing out" effect implied by the adjust­
ments restoring a private savings equilibrium and the constraint on this 
process given by the net present value of the project, have not been ex-
plicitly incorporated into the analysis in the earlier literature, which 
was essentially partial equilibrium in character. The failure to view the 
impact of public projects within a general equilibrium context has led to 
a critical error. 
A second set of constraints on the above adjustments is given by 
the assumption that individuals 1 through 4 have positive consumption and 
savings, both before and after the project is introduced. That is 
s i + dsi > 0, i=l, ••• ,4. (22) 
and 
ial, ... ,5. (2 3) 
. i 
where dy is a shorthand notation for the change in individual i's income 
-due to the project and due to chan~es in his receipts for the previous 
generation. We assume that the project is sufficiently "small" that 
positivity constraints (22) and (23) are not violated. The adjustments of 
private voluntary savings re qui red to restore the private savings equilibriur., 
as induced by the project, are all assumed to be feasible. If the project 
onwas "large" and the difference between the initial impact of the project 
eachindividual and its final general equilibrium impact was also lar~e, some 
of the required adjustments could be infeasible. 
Finally, we consider the generalization of our results. Our results 
extend immediately ton generations. So far as the first n-1 generations 
are concerned, no restrictions on the numher of individuals involved in 
each, or on the way the total net returns to generatioa t, Bt, is 
distributed within that generatio~need be introduced. This is seen 
-17-
readily be examining equations (11) to (16). The first n-1 generations 
may contain m1 , m2 , ••• , mn-l individuals, and the net returns to each 
generation and the savings from the previous generations may each be 
distributed in any way (not necessar.ily related). Summing the mt equations 
defining the change in consumption of the members of generation t eliminates 
all distributional parameters as before. The resulting equations may then 
each be divided by (1 + p) t and summed as before; the conclusions are unaltered. 
A difficulty arises when the final generation is allowed to contain 
more than one individual and the proportions in which the savings of the 
previous generation are distributed among these individuals differ from 
the proportions in which the total project returns to the final generation, 
B , are distributed. For a sufficiently large divergence between the 
n 
two, there may be no way that the private donations of the previous 
generation can "smooth out'' the equilibrium consumption changes of the 
members of the final generation sufficiently to guarantee that they all 
have the same sign. This problem arises only for the final generation 
and occurs because that generation necessarily has no savings variable 
itself which it can adjust, a problem which is essentially an artifact 
of using finite period models. Nevertheless, to guarantee that all the 
dci variables for the members of the fin~l generation have the same sign 
it is necessary to introduce a separate redistributional mechanism (for 
the final generation alone) or to impose the restriction that the savings 
of the previous generation and the returns from the project are distributed 
among the nembers of the final generation in the same non-negative pro-
portions. 
-18-
IV. THE "SOCIAL" RATE OF DISCOUNT :Ai.~D THE SHADOW PRICE OF CAPITAL 
The existence of an isolation paradox of the type identified by Eckstein, 
Sen and Marglin has been used as a rationale for a benefit-cost methodology 
differing in two essential ways from the calculation of~ as above. The 
first difference concerns the rate of discount, as we have explained in 
Section II. The second concerns the introduction of a "shadow price of 
capital". This parameter reflects the value of consumption, present and 
future, foregone by drawing the necessary capital into the public sector to 
set up the project. In Marglin [1963b] and Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] 
·the calculation of the shadow price of capital is discussed at length. All 
the expressions presented are described as approximations to the appropriate 
shadow price, even though most are quite complicated, and we do not 
propose to discuss their details here.13All depend, in various ways, on 
the private rate of discount, p, and the "social" rate of discount, r, 
and have the property that for r < p, S
K 
~ 1. What is clear is that 
the shadow price of capital is the same for all "small" projects, 
assuming they are financed in the same way. 
In the previous section we argued that when there is inter-genera­
tional benvolence, and whether the isolation paradox holds or not, 
projects can be ranked according to their welfare effects by means of 
their net present value at the market rate of discount. At best, any 
alternative benefit-cost analysis procedure will give equivalent results. 
The question we wish to raise is whether the "social" rate of discount/ 
shadow price of capital methodology outlined above can in principle give 
results equivalent to those obtained with Nx. Denote the shadow price p 
of capital S.
K 
Then the two procedures we are considering amount to 
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Table 1 




a -1 0 
4 
b -1 2 0 
i
l ---------------------------- ~-· 
Suppose, for example, that p= 1. Then referring to project
s a and 
. a = ~
b 
= 0.
b in Table 1 (assumed "small"), we find using (24) that :N p p 
As we have shown, it follows that individuals 1 and 2 are i
ndifferent be-
To give equivalent results,tween accepting or rejecting either project. 




For r > -1 these equations have the unique solution r = 1 and S
K = l; 
if -1 < r < 1 in both ( 25a) and ( 25b), then S
K 
cannot have the same value 
of S of 16/9for the two projects. For example, r = 1/2 imp1ie s values 
K 
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and 8 in (25a) and (25b), respectively. Expression (25) cannot yield 
the correct selection criterion when r differs from p unless either 
the shadow price of capital or the "social" rate of discount is "tailor­
made" for each of the two projects. Clearly (21) fails as a decentralized 
evaluation methodology. It cannot properly capture the general equilihriurn 




This paper has employed a simple general equilibrium model of 
inter-generational benevolence to examine the validity of a widely 
accepted claim based on the new-famous ''prisoner's dilemma" problem. 
This claim is that the existence of a special form of inter-generational 
benevolence, known as the isolation paradox case, implies that the rate 
of discount used in benefit-cost analysis should be below the mar~et 
(private) rate of discount. We have found that the argum~nt cannot be 
sustained and have attempted to show that the appropriate rate of dis­
count is the market rate, whether the isolation paradox exists or not. 
Under relatively weak assumptions, the existence of inter-generational 
benevclence implies that the calculation of the net present value of 
a project at the market rate of discount provides an unambiguous indicator 
of the effects of the project on the welfare of each individual, regardless 
of the distributional impact of the project, a much stronger result than 
can be shown in the absence of inter-generational benevolence. The case 
for this benefit-cost rule is strengthened, rather than weakened, hy the 
existence of inter-generational transfers, even when the isolation paradox 
holds. Alternative benefit-cost procedures, involving the calculation 
of a "social rate of discount" and a "shadow price of capital" are infor­
mationally more costly and could at best provide equivalent iesults; hut 
we have attempted to show that such an equivalence is not possible in 
general. 
Finally, we wish to make it clear that the results of this paper 
cast no doubt on the analytical validity, intellectual interest, or 
potential social importance of the isolation paradox argument itself, 
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or of other, similar forms of the "prisoner's dilemma" framework. What 
we have questioned is one particular, but important, application of this 
analysis: the claim that, in an economy where private savings for bene­
volent purposes and public (or private) investment coexist, projects 
should be discounted at a rate below the market rate of discount. It 
remains true that if the isolation paradox holds, the equilihriurn under 
private savings is not Pareto optimal; but discounting public (or private) 
investment at a rate other than the market rate of discount does not 
represent an opportunity for achieving a welfare gain. Public policies 
seldom, if ever, resemble the form of all-embracing social contract en­
visaged in the isolation paradox argument (specifying that each person 
Public policies are superimposedincrease his total savings by one unit). 
on the actions of private. decision-makers, who then adjust, and when these 
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FOOTNOTES 
1For example, see Prest and Turvey [1965] pp. 697-698, Dasgupta, Marglin 
and Sen [1972], p. 160, Layard [1972] pp. 37-39, Herfindahl and Kneese 
[1974], pp. 206-209, Mishan [1976] pp. 206-207, Boadway [1978] pp. 265-
266, Boadway [1979] pp. 198-200. 
2 see Tullock [1964], Lind [1964], Usher [1964], Lecomber [1977] and 
Wellisz [1977). 
3As Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972] point out (pp. 162, 174), many 
investment rules that are equivalent in two period models are not 
equivalent in models with more than two periods. The generalization of 
our results is discussed at the end of Section III. 
4The analogy between savings as treated here and a public good in 
the Samuelsonian sense is discussed in Sen [1972] and its externality 
character is discussed in Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972], p. 160. 
5It should be clear that it is not simply the existence of inter-generational 
benevolence that is the source of the isolation paradox but its presence 
combined with the relative absence of intra-generational benevolence. 
6Eckstein [1958] pp. 99-100 presented the essence of this argument, 
which later became known as the "isolation paradox," in support 
of a discount rate for evalu,ating natural resource projects below 
the market rate of interest: "It is not logically inconsistent for 
the same person to be willing to borrow at high interest rates to 
increase his present consumption while voting to spend tax money to 
build a project from which future generations will benefit, for in 
the case of a vote to tax, he can be sure that the other individuals 
in the society will be compelled to act similarly" 
7 1 2Recalling that r and r can differ, it also appears from (10) that 
whenever they did differ it would be possible in principle to construct 
a project that was beneficial for one and harmful for the other. 
We shall return to this issue at the end of Section IV. 
8The ·meaning of "small" will become clear at the end of Section III. 
9Returning to the discussion at the end of Section II it is now clear 
that since the dC terms will all have the same sign, the discount 
rate applied to tfiem, once they were actually computed, would be 
irrelevant. Any discount rate would do. 
lOThis conclusion continues to hold if the inequality in (6) is reversed, 
implying an isolation paradox of the opposite type from that considered 
by Marglin and Sen. 
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11
Clearly, V < 0 would imply that W was lowered by an increase in 
each individual's lump sum income, Y.i 
12 XAnother way of putting this is that N measures the net wealth
generated by the project. P 
13rhe "shadow price of capital" analysis derives from the recognition
that private savings will ordinarily be affected by the income changes.
resulting from a project, but confines itself to those resulting from
the initial establishment of the project. On the other hand, the
"social" rate of discount analysis discussed in Section II rests on
the implicit assumption that the levels of private savings are un­
affected by the income changes resulting from the adoption of a
project, that all adjustment in response to a project takes place
in consumption alone. This implies that the dC terms in (10) are
t -
the same as the B~ terms, but it is then not possible for the private 
savings equilibrium conditions (2) to hold both before and after the
project is adopted. See Dasgupta, Marglin and Sen [1972), chapters13 and 14. 
